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Legal Implications of the Cuban Crisis
The situation in Cuba which confronted this country last fall and the action
taken to meet it are matters still vivid in our memory. The President of the United
States succinctly and dramatically presented them during the course of his historic
address to the nation. He began by stating that it had been clearly established
that a series of offensive missile sites was then in preparation on that imprisoned
island.
The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike
capability against the Western Hemisphere. . . . In addition, jet bombers,
capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled
in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared. . . .To halt this
offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment
under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for
Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of
offensive weapons, be turned back.1
The President also said he had "directed the continued close surveillance of
Cuba and its military buildup," and announced that we would "regard any nuclear
missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as
an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory
response upon the Soviet Union." 2
What legal implications are involved in thus imposing a quarantine against
all shipping bound for Cuba, in directing a surveillance involving overflights of
Cuba, and in treating the launching of a Soviet missile against another nation
of the Western Hemisphere as if it were an attack upon the United States? The
following discussion will attempt to answer these questions in some detail by
examining their current legality and political background.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY
The last question will be considered first. By what right did the President
commit this nation to treat an attack on some Latin-American country as an
attack upon the United States? To this there is a quick answer.
The first of our current mutual defense pacts, the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance of 1947, generally referred to as the Rio Treaty, was com-
plete authority for such a pronouncement by the President. All twenty Latin-
American republics as well as the United States were parties to that treaty.
The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State
against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the
American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties
undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations. 3
That treaty had the advice and consent of the Senate and under the Constitu-
' 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 715, 716 (1962).
2 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 718 (1962).
'62 Stat. 1681, 1700 (1948).
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tion became the law of the land. 4 The President, as the Chief Executive and as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, 5 needed no further authority to make
the statement he did regarding retaliation against the Soviet Union. We were
internationally committed to this policy. Any other course of action might have
subjected us to the accusation of violating our international obligation.
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AND QUARANTINE
Aerial surveillance of Cuba is, in many respects, tied to the quarantine opera-
tion as far as the legal implications are concerned and should be treated together.
Certainly the overflights would be an invasion of the airspace of Cuba," just as
action on the high seas to stop ships bound for Cuba would be an invasion of
the rights of the state whose flag those ships were flying.7
There appears to be no question, however, that the President was supported
by domestic law in his Cuban action. The Constitutional powers of the President
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces are well known. Furthermore, in
this matter, the President was assured of Congressional backing by the Joint
Resolution of the Congress of October 3, 1962, which expressed the determina-
tion of the United States "to prevent in Cuba the creation . . .of an externally
supported military capability endangering the security of the United States.""
More important to our discussion, nevertheless, are the problems raised by
the international aspects of the Cuban affair. We shall deal with three of them
in particular: the problem of our relationship with Latin America, questions in-
volving the Charter of the United Nations, and legal issues under what is some-
times called customary international law.
In dealing with questions of international law it is often impossible to discuss
the legal issues without giving some consideration to the political climate in
which the law is to operate. It will be helpful, therefore, to first take a brief
look at the political background of the resolution of the Latin-American Foreign
Ministers meeting in Washington with Secretary Rusk, which authorized the so-
called "quarantine."
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
In 1954 communism got a brief foothold in Guatemala. At that time the
Organization of American States adopted a resolution which condemned the
activities of the international communist movement as constituting intervention
in American affairs and declared that "the domination or control of the political
institutions of any American State by the international communist movement,
extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power,
' U.S. CONST. art. VI.6 U.S. CONST. art. II, § § 1, 2.
6 "The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over
the airspace above its territory." International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago Civil Aviation
Agreement), Dec. 7, 1944, art. I, 59 Stat. 1693, to which the United States and Cuba are parties.
7 "Ships shall sail under'the flag of one state only and . . . shall be subject to its exclusive
jurisdiction on the high seas." Convention on the High Seas art. 6, para. 1, reproduced in 52 Am. J.
INT'rL L. 842 (1958).
8 76 Stat. 697 (1962).
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would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the
American States, endangering the peace of America."9
The emphasis was clearly on intervention. Latin-Americans are intensely
nationalistic and have a marked aversion to anything resembling intervention in
the internal affairs of a state. This tendency was aggravated, to be sure, by our
own acts in sending marines to disturbed areas in Latin-America during the early
twentieth century. We had, however, renounced this policy in the Convention
on Rights and Duties of States which we had entered into with the other Amer-
ican republics in 1933.10 In article 8 of the Convention we expressly committed
ourselves to a very significant proposition: "No state has the right to intervene in
the internal or external affairs of another." In 1954 the Latin-Americans would
have considered any action or sanctions against Guatemala an intervention in its
choice of government.
In 1960 at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers at San Jose, Costa Rica, we
sought sanctions against Castro, yet all we could obtain at that time was another
condemnation of intervention by extracontinental powers in affairs of an Amer-
ican state. 1 However, at Punta del Este in January 1962, after reiterating adher-
ence to the principles of self-determination and non-intervention, the Foreign
Ministers produced a resolution with teeth in it. The resolution stated that "the
present Government of Cuba, which has officially identified itself as a Marxist-
Leninist government, is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the
inter-American system. [And] that this incompatibility excludes the present
Government of Cuba from participation in the inter-American system."'12 The
Ministers asked that steps be taken to adopt measures to carry out this resolution.
Such steps were taken, and since then twenty instead of twenty-one states have
acted in matters concerning the Organization of American States and related
organs."3
It is against this background that we come to the action taken last October
instituting aerial surveillance over Cuba and imposing the so-called quarantine
on shipments of offensive weapons to Cuba. To deal now with the legal points
involved in this action, we should turn to the Rio Treaty of 1947 on which such
action was fundamentally based.
THE Rio TREATY OF 1947
A concept of hemispheric solidarity in the matter of defense had been taking
shape during the early forties. That concept was finally incorporated in the Act
of Chapultepec of March 3, 1945,14 which was the master plan for the Rio Treaty.
The Treaty stated its paramount purpose to be: "to assure peace, through ade-
quate means, to provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks
against any American State, and . .. to deal with threats of aggression against
'30 DEP'T STATE BULL. 638 (1954).
10 49 Stat. 3097 (1936).
"See 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 407 (1960).
"46 DEP'T STATE BULL. 278, 279, 281 (1962).
147 DEP'T STATE BULL. 591, 592 (1962).
"12 DEP'T STATE BULL. 339 (1945).
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any of them."1 5 We are not here concerned with the provisions dealing with armed
attack but rather with those designed to assure the peace of the Americas and
to deal with any threat of aggression.
Article 6 of the Rio Treaty recognized that a nation's security and integrity
could be threatened by other means than armed attack.
If the inviolability of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence
of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an
armed attack . . . or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the
peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order
to agree on the measures which .. .should be taken for the common defense
and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.' 6
The measures on which the Organ of Consultation might agree include partial
or complete interruption of sea and air communications, and the use of armed
force.1 7 The consultations mentioned shall take place at meetings of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs of the American republics, whose decisions shall be by two-
thirds vote.' 8 Complete information concerning activities undertaken or contem-
plated for the purpose of maintaining inter-American peace and security are to
be reported immediately by the parties to the Security Council of the United
Nations. 19 It was further provided that this function of consultation might be
carried out "provisionally" by the Governing Board of the Pan American Union,
2 0
which is now the Council of the Organization of American States.
2 1
Acting pursuant to these provisions, the Council met on October 23, 1962 at
the Pan American Union in Washington. At the end of a full day's discussion,
it adopted a momentous resolution, which was immediately reported to the
Security Council of the United Nations. That resolution called for the immediate
dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with
any offensive capability and recommended that the member states, in accordance
with articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty, take all measures, individually and col-
lectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to
ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-
Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the
peace and security of America, "and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offen-
sive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of
the Continent.."22 All voted in favor of this resolution save the representative of
Uruguay, who abstained since he lacked instructions due to failure of communica-
tions with his government. 23
This resolution was precisely in accordance with the provisions of the Rio
Treaty. It was in line with the purpose of the Treaty "to assure peace .. .and
"1 62 Stat. 1681, 1699-1700 (1948).
1" 62 Stat. 1681, 1701 (1948). Emphasis supplied.
"62 Stat. 1681, 1701 (1948).
"62 Stat. 1681, 1702 (1948).
1" 62 Stat. 1681, 1701 (1948).
20 62 Stat. 1681 ,1702 (1948).
21 Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, arts. 51, 52, [1952] 2 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. 2394 (effective Dec. 13, 1951).
12 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 723 (1962).
2 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 722 (1962).
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to deal with threats of aggression against any of" the American states;24 it was
taken because of a "situation that might endanger the peace of America,"25 and
it was designed "for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Conti-
nent."2 Thus, the measures authorized were those specified in article 8.
Politically, the Foreign Ministers had come a long way from their vague con-
demnations of communist intervention. In January 1962 they had barred Cuba
from the association with the American republics; by October they were ready
to invoke sanctions of the most extreme nature authorized by the Rio Treaty.
Had we been forced to act without this collective blessing of the use of armed
force given by the Latin-American nations, they would quite likely have viewed
whatever we might have done as "intervention" in Cuban affairs, in violation of
our 1933 commitment so frequently reiterated. Regardless of any legal justifica-
tion we might have had, we would probably have been branded by them as an
illegal aggressor. In the solution of this international problem where political
bodies (such as the Organization of American States and the United Nations)
were bound to play so large a role, there had to be a marriage of law and politics
to achieve a result acceptable to international society.
The resolution clearly was broad enough to cover the action of the United
States, both as to the quarantine and to the surveillance. However, it might also
be noted with respect to the surveillance that at an informal meeting held on the
second and third days of October 1962, the Latin-American representatives had
already taken the position "that it is desirable to intensify individual and
collective surveillance of the delivery of arms and implements of war and all
other items of strategic importance to the communist regime of Cuba.."27
Thus the procedures prescribed by our hemispheric commitments were fol-
lowed, and proper authorization was obtained to legalize what might otherwise
have been construed as a breach of our non-intervention agreement. But the
question still remains, how does this resolution of October 23, 1962 and the
action taken by the United States pursuant thereto square with the Charter of
the United Nations?
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
When- the Charter was being drafted in San Francisco in 1945, the Act of
Chapultepec already had. been approved. That Act had recommended the very
sort of regional arrangement that was later incorporated in the Rio Treaty. It
specifically provided that the "use of armed force to prevent . . . aggression"
constituted actions which might appropriately be taken by the regional arrange-
ment.28 Was this arrangement consistent with article 52 of chapter VIII of the
Charter of the United Nations, which authorized the use of regional arrange-
ments for "dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such
2 62 Stat. 1681, 1699-1700 (1948).
25 62 Stat. 1681, 1701 (1948).
26 62 Stat. 1681, 1701 (1948).
27 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 599, 600 (1962).28 12 DEPT. STATE BULL. 339 (1945).
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arrangements . . . and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations?"
2 9
At San Francisco the Colombian delegate made a statement before the
drafters of the Charter concerning the application of article 52 to the proposed
inter-American system.
The Act of Chapultepec provides for the collective defense of the hemisphere.
. ..Consequently such action as [the American States] may take to repel
aggression, authorized by the article is legitimate for all of them. Such action
is in accord with the Charter, by approval of the article, and a regional ar-
rangement may take action, provided it does not have improper purposes
as, for example, joint aggression against another state. From this, it may be
deduced that the approval of this article implies that the Act of Chapultepec
is not in contravention of the Charter.3 0
The above statement was not challenged, and it is clear from the history of
the negotiations that nothing in the Charter's provisions about regional arrange-
ments should be interpreted to inhibit action authorized and taken under the
Rio Treaty as long as the purpose of the action was proper.
The "Purposes and Principles" of the United Nations are found in the preamble
and article 1 of the Charter. The preamble states the determination of the
peoples of the founding states "to unite our strength .. .to ensure . ..that
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest." Article 1 includes
among the purposes of the United Nations, "to maintain international peace and
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace." The collective action taken in October
1962 was taken to prevent and to remove a threat to the peace of the hemisphere
that would have resulted from the introduction and emplacement of potentially
annihilating weapons. Those weapons were not to be used in the common
interest. The action we took was designed to ensure that they were not used
for any other purpose, and thus was calculated to maintain international peace
and security. This was precisely in accord with the purposes and principles of
the Charter.
Article 2 of the Charter enjoins members to "refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force .. .in any ...manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." It was the Soviet-Cuban combine
that was using a threat of force in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations. Our action was taken to remove that threat and to secure
the peace.
The only other article that might have a bearing upon this discussion is
article 53. Article 53 provides that the Security Council may utilize regional
arrangements for "enforcement action under its authority." However, it further
states that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements
without the authorization of the Security Council." The question is thus posed
whether "enforcement action" as used in this latter clause refers to the enforce-
ment action previously mentioned in the article; that is, to action authorized
29 The Charter of the United Nations is found at 59 Stat. 1031 (1945).
30 Information and text of statement furnished by the Department of State.
19631
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
by the Security Council, or whether it refers to any action that might be described
as enforcement action even though not initiated by the Security Council.
The Security Council has itself settled this point. In 1960 it rejected the
notion that sanctions against the Dominican Republic, invoked by recommenda-
tion of the Organization of American States, were "enforcement action" as the
term is used in article 53.31 It reached a like decision on the sanctions against
Cuba early in 1962 growing out of the Punta del Este Conference mentioned
earlier.3 2 Furthermore, a recent decision of the International Court of Justice 3
seems to have interpreted the term as used in the Charter to mean only action
ordered by the Security Council under chapter VII. Nothing, however, was
done by the Security Council under chapter VII in the case of Cuba. Article 53
is, therefore, not applicable, and the inexorable conclusion would seem to be
that not only was the action of last October taken pursuant to the provisions of
the Rio Treaty, it was also wholly consistent with the Charter of the United
Nations.
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
There remains one further question; a question which, it would seem, the
general public considers the only question: Was the blockade legal under
international law apart from what our organizational treaties may have provided?
A blockade is usually a war measure employed against an enemy. What this
country did was clearly not a blockade in that sense. In the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries there were a number of instances of so-called "pacific block-
ades," which involved blockading the commerce of another country with which
the blockading state was at peace. These were designed to bring economic
pressure to bear in order to enforce redress of certain wrongs.3 4 They were
called "pacific" because no war was declared or prosecuted by the one party,
and the other could treat it as a measure consistent with peace, thus avoiding
the outbreak of war. 5
A serious problem of a pacific blockade came in those instances where ships
of third parties were also stopped. Frequently this practice was protested by
the third party's government. Indeed, the United States protested such action
against its flag vessels when Japan, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, imposed
"The Soviet Delegate took the position that the San Jose resolution of the Organization of
American States calling for sanctions against the Dominican Republic was "enforcement action" and
must be approved by the Security Council as provided by art. 53. The Council did not accept this
view and merely took note of the resolution. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 14th year, 893d
meeting 3-5 (S/4491) (1960).
32 By letter dated March 8, 1962, addressed to the President of the Security Council (U.N. Doc.
No. S/5086) the Permanent Representative of Cuba took the position that the resolution adopted
at Punta del Este in January, 1962, was "enforcement action" and required authorization of the
Security Council. Although the question was thus brought to the attention of the Security Council
it took no action in the matter.
"8 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 1053,
1062-63 (1962).
" Giraud, Pacific Blockade up to the Time of Foundation of the League, LEAGUE OF NATIONS
OFF. J., 8th Ass. 8.41 (1927).
35 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1667-68 (2d rev. ed. 1945).
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a pacific blockade of Chinese ports. We protested even though our ships were
stopped only for the purpose of checking identification papers.
36
The use of our Navy and Air Force last fall against shipping headed for Cuba
was neither a blockade of war nor a pacific blockade. It should be noted that
both of these measures are aimed at the commerce of the other state in order
to deprive it of imported goods as well as revenues from the sale of exports,
thus bringing economic pressure to bear on the situation. With Cuba we specifi-
cally proclaimed we were not stopping legitimate commerce, only the importation
of offensive missiles and other weapons of aggression. 3 7 In fact, practically no
Cuban shipping was involved. The measures were primarily directed against
shipping of third states, particularly the Soviet Union.
Our government has for these reasons chosen not to call our action a blockade,
but a "quarantine,"3 8 which is as good a term as any. It might be well to recall
at this point that, in 1937, President Roosevelt spoke of a "quarantine" when
seeking to prevent the spread of lawlessness and war throughout the world.39
In substance our conduct during the Cuban crisis was a preventive measure,
short of war, designed to inhibit the dispersal of offensive missiles and nuclear
bomb capabilities in an area of the world heretofore free of them. It was adopted
to remove a threat to international peace and security, and its thrust was against
those states responsible for the creation of that threat. Whether it be called a
blockade, a quarantine, or something else, no one can point to anything in inter-
national law that forbids this type of action. On the contrary, it is wholly within
the principles adopted by the nations of the world in the Charter of their
organization.
CONCLUSION
During World War I, Sir Samuel Evens, speaking of the general principles
governing the right of restriction of the commerce of third states, pointed out
the inherent flexibility of international law.
[T]he boundary of the law of nations has been extended from time to time
to adapt itself to new and ever-changing conditions. This law must from
its nature have room for expansion .... It never had or could have the quality
of immutability attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians. It could
not be confined within artificial limits like an Act of Parliament. It has the
essence and qualities of a living organism like the common law of this realm.
40
It is submitted that in the action taken to save the peace and security of the
Western Hemisphere and, indeed, of the world, the United States has written
a new chapter in international law by a sound, albeit novel, application of those
of its principles which are basic to the collective security arrangement of the
Rio Pact and to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
30 7 HACKWOnTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1940).
17 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 715, 716-18 (1962).
3847 DEP'T STATE BULL. 716 (The President), 721 (Secretary Rusk), 725 (Ambassador
Stevenson), 764-65 (Legal Adviser of the Department of State) (1962).
11 President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Chicago speech of October 5, 1937, reproduced in material
part in BROCKWAY, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 116-17 (1957).
10 Quoted in The Lenora and Other Vessels, [1918] I.C.J. Rep. 182, 202-04, and in 7 HACK-
WORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (1940).
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The wise employment of force is still essential if we are to check lawless
aggression, and threats of aggression throughout the world. Until there comes
about an effective world government fully supported by the various nations, or
at least a substantial number of them, the burden of furnishing the armed force
to take the necessary action to preserve international order must still fall on those
states powerful enough to produce the desired result. Only thus will it be
possible for men to live under some semblance of peace.
John M. Raymond*
* A.B., Princeton University, 1916; LL.B., Harvard University, 1921. Member, Massachusetts
and United States Supreme Court Bars. Lecturer in International Law, University of Santa Clara
School of Law. Former Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, 1956-60.
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